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THE COMMERCIAL BANK TRUST DEPARTMENT
AND THE "WALL"*
EDWARD S. HERMAN**
CARL F. SAFANDA***
INTRODUCTION
A traditional goal of commercial banks has been the efficient uti-
lization of bank personnel and internally generated information to
further the interests of the institution as a whole. Toward this end,
information has flowed along well-established lines of communication
between the commercial department of a bank and the bank's trust
department for their mutual benefit. Confidential information received
by the commercial banking department functioning as a creditor has
been included in this internal flow, and has sometimes proved valu-
able to the trust department in making investment decisions. During
the past decade, however, emerging judicial interpretation of the se-
curities laws relating to the improper use of "inside information" has
raised a serious threat to these interdepartmental banking relation-
ships. More than that, it has placed the banks in a dilemma: use by
the trust department of confidential information generated by the
commercial department may give rise to liability for violation of in-
sider rules; failure to use such information may subject the bank to
liability as a negligent fiduciary or at least place the bank in an awk-
ward position vis-à-vis its trust customers.'
In response to this dilemma, many banks have attempted to estab-
lish a "wall" between the commercial and trust departments so as to
cut off some or all information flows. The success of this response to
the problem depends largely upon the nature of the previously existing
reationships between trust and commercial departments, and the
capacity and willingness of banks to alter them. This article, then,
* This article is in part a product of research sponsored by the Center for the
Study of Financial Institutions of the University of Pennsylvania Law School. In this
research, the authors focused heavily on interviews with past and present trust depart-
ment personnel. Approximately 300 individuals representing 65 banks of various sizes
and locations throughout the country were interviewed in the period 1971-1972.
** Professor of Finance, Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, University of
Pennsylvania. A.B., 1945, M.A., 1948, University of Pennsylvania; Ph.D., 1953, Univer-
sity of California, Berkeley.
*** A.B., 1964, Northwestern University; J.D., 1967, University of Illinois; M.B.A.,
1969, University of Pennsylvania; associate, Hudson & Wilf, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
The author is a former Fellow of the Center for the Study of Financial Institutions of
the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1 See, e.g., Trading in Penn Central Stock: Financial Institutions and Privileged
Information, Staff of House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.,
Report on the Penn Central Failure and the Role of Financial Institutions, pt. V, at 313
(1971).
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begins with a consideration of the legal and historical background of
information flows between bank departments. The next section con-
siders the legal problems created for banks by the new and changing
status of "insiders." The balance of the article utilizes interview data
and historical materials to analyze the business and structural factors
that have influenced the development and effectiveness of bank walls
and to appraise the present state of wall construction in trust banks.
The article concludes with a brief analysis of some major policy options
and proposals for dealing with some of the problems that the wall has
not yet resolved.
I. THE POTENTIAL CONFLICT IN LEGAL DUTIES OF
BANK TRUSTEES
A. Traditional Patterns of Information Flows and the Law
In the years preceding the rise of the "insider" problem and the
potential liabilities associated with the possession and use of privileged
information, it was an established and unquestioned practice for a
bank to make unrestricted internal use of information generated by
all of the activities in which the bank was engaged. A strong link,
based upon long-standing and deeply rooted business practices that
originated in the bank's profit interest, existed between the commercial
and trust departments. Such a relationship accorded with generally
accepted trust law principles, which required a trustee to keep in-
formed and to be in a position to act if an investment became im-
prudent.2
 Indeed, one of the original arguments for association of trust
and commercial banking functions was to secure to the former "better
investment facilities and a stronger group of directors, and the valu-
able information and help which can be obtained from other de-
partments of a bank." 8
 For example, the publicly-made explanation
of—and justification for—the absorption of Equitable Trust and
Interstate Trust by Chase National Bank in 1930 emphasized that
2
 G. Bogert, Law of Trusts 284-85 (4th ed. 1963). See In re First Nat'l Bank, 25
N.Y.S.2d 221 (Sup. Ct. 1941); In re Buckelew's Estate, 128 N.J. Eq. 81, 13 A.2d 855
(Prerog. Ct. 1940); Tannenbaum v. Seacoast Trust Co. 125 N.J. Eq. 360, 5 A.2d 778
(Ct. Err. App. 1939); In re Clark's Will, 257 N.Y. 132, 177 N.E. 397 (1931); In re
Stark's Estate, 15 N.Y.S. 729 (Sur. Ct. 1891). A trustee is generally held responsible for
knowledge of relevant facts readily ascertainable at the time of his action or failure to
act. People's State Bank & Trust Co. v. Wade, 269 Ky. 89, 106 S.W.2d 74 (1937); In re
Cowles' Will, 22 App. Div. 2d 365, 255 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1965); In re Weinz' Will, 59
N.Y.S.2d 576 (Sur. Ct. 1945).
Although citation to general trust law principles is helpful, the authors recognize
that such broad rules are difficult to apply in the absence of a specific factual context.
Each case involving the duties and responsibilities of a trustee must turn on its own
peculiar facts and circumstances. In re First Nat'l Bank, 25 N.Y.S.2d 221, 229 (Sup Ct.
1941).
8 Remington, Trust Business of Tomorrow, 67 Trust Companies 677 (1938).
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"[t]he extensive information and wide experience of the bank as a
whole will be available to the executive officers of the trust department
"4
Major banks traditionally buttressed their efforts to secure new
trust business with the argument that their commercial officers' knowl-
edge of their extensive clientele could be expected to contribute to the
investment performance of the trust department. Bank directors, al-
though ostensibly chosen only to exercise their independent judgment,
were expected to function as sophisticated informants as well. From
an early date, it was anticipated that bank directors who had close
associations with other institutions could be helpful not only in cement-
ing harmonious relations between the bank and those institutions, but
also because the knowledge they acquired from the latter often proved
useful in their capacities as bank directors .° Directors on the board's
trust committee were selected both on the basis of their ability to
discriminate properly between investments and reduce the chance of
loss to a minimum and because in the daily conduct of their affairs
within the city they were likely to receive the latest information affect-
ing the value of securities held by the bank.° Such selection practices
were important in an age of limited professional sources of informa-
tion and slow dissemination of knowledge. They were also important
because of the frequent use, in securities markets, of manipulative
practices deliberately intended to mislead the unwary. Referring to
the necessity for piercing through such deceptive devices, one early
treatise on trust companies noted that stock ticker information must
be
supplemented by "inside information," for stock quotations
by themselves may prove anything but safe guides. The op-
erations of a bull or bear pool may give the market a ficti-
tious appearance, and a "wash sale" may fix the quotation in
4 Chase National Bank to Provide Superior Type of Trust Service Upon Consumma-
tion of Merger, 50 Trust Companies 765 (1930) (quoting press release of merging banks).
6 Affiliations Between National Bank and Trust Company Interests, 3 Trust Com-
panies 864-65 (1906).
0
 Vierling, Investment of Trust Funds by Trust Companies, Proceedings of the
Trust Company Section, American Bankers' Association 117 (1898).
One of the requisites for a functional trust committee of the board of directors
was that it be comprised of individuals knowledgeable in matters relevant to the trust
department:
The head of a Trust Department would seek, for instance, a director especially
qualified in regard to real estate matters; likewise a representative especially
familiar with securities; one especially familiar with manufacturing and indus-
trial problems; and finally one or morel especially familiar with Law pertaining
to trust administration and property rights and problems.
Freiberger, What the Trust Department Expects of Directors, 68 Trusts and Estates 225
(1939).
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order to regulate loaning values, when to find a real pur-
chaser the limit would have to be dropped many points.?
The lower-level committee structure of the bank was also designed
to facilitate the flow of information. At the trust investment committee
level, for example, participation by both commercial and trust officers
was often thought to have special benefit for the trust department:
The Trust Investment Committee affords an excellent oppor-
tunity for a close tie with the commercial department of the
bank [and] it is well to have one or more commercial offi-
cers included in the membership . . . . They bring to the
Committee knowledge of the bank's commercial loans and
investments in its own portfolio which is valuable on many
occasions. This benefit could well be reversed by having the
chairman of the committee, who normally would head the
investment division of the trust department, meet occasion-
ally with the loaning officers of the bank to keep them in-
formed regarding investment policies. Such meetings could
well follow field trips for the study of particular industries, or
at periods when changing conditions alter investment proce-
dure in any respect.'
Trust officers were sometimes encouraged to "sit in" on loan meet-
ings,' and in many cases credit department memos were regularly sent
to the trust department."
Early trust law assumed that the special skills, knowledge, and
contacts of the bank, as of other professional trustees, would be put
to use for the benefit of its trust beneficiaries. In the words of one
court:
[A] great trust company, having at its command special
knowledge of market and financial conditions and an organi-
zation skilled in the investment of funds, must, in the exer-
cise of ordinary care, bring to the management of estates
entrusted to its care this specialized knowledge and experi-
F. B. Kirkbridge, J. E. Sterrett and H. P. Willis, The Modern Trust Company
121 (6th ed. 1925).
8 Statement of Clarence R. Chaney, Vice Chairman of the Board, Northwestern
National Bank of Minneapolis, quoted in Trust Service for Commercial Customers, 88
Trusts and Estates 365 (1949).
9 Cock; Practical Program for Bank-Trust Cooperation, 90 Trusts and Estates 748
(1951). The article also describes the practice of having all trust officers meet weekly
with senior executives and senior lending officers of the bank so that the trust officers
might "obtain outside points of view on the management of estates entrusted to their
care." Id. at 750.
10 Wilkinson, Don't Isolate Your Trust Department, 99 Trusts and Estates 576
(1960).
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ence, since an ordinarily prudent man in the exercise of
ordinary care would not fail to do this in the management of
his own affairs if such advantages were available to him."
Thus, the greater the flow of illuminating information between de-
partments, the better for the bank, since the more informed the
trustee's judgment, the less the likelihood of liability for neglect of
fiduciary duty. In fact, effective trust administration was considered
by some commentators to be possible only where there was effective
cooperation between the banking and trust departments." Solicitation
of information from "insiders"" and reliance upon the judgments of
persons close to the insiders were material evidence of the trustee's care
and prudence." A New York case involving an attempt by beneficiaries
to hold a trust company trustee liable for negligently retaining certain
sugar company securities in the trust illustrates the point." The will
creating the trust authorized the trustee to continue the decedent's
investments "without any personal liability for so doing," and thus the
trustee could have been found liable only had it been proved that he
had failed to exercise reasonable care. In the court's view:
It cannot be said that the trustee was negligent in the sense
that it was inattentive to its duty, or ignored the question
whether a sale of the stocks was advisable or otherwise. The
securities of the trust were examined and considered by a
committee of the trustee's directors at least once in every six
months. This committee was composed of distinguished finan-
ciers, members of the New York Stock Exchange, lawyers
and others of note in business circles. It was their judgment
11 Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Ott, 248 App. Div. 406, 415, 289 N.Y.S. 228, 237
(1936) (dissenting opinion).
12 Treman, Need of Close Working Relationship Between Commercial and Trust
Departments, 100 Trusts and Estates 1169, 1171 (1961).
13 Before 1960, no distinction was made between what an insider knew and
"inside information." The technical legal definition which has emerged since that time
considers "inside information" to be a subset of the category which includes all insider
knowledge.
14 See, e.g., In re Pate's Estate, 84 N.Y.S.2d 853 (Sur. Ct. 1948). The trustee was
justified in considering the opinion of the beneficiary, formed through personal contact
with certain "insiders." More than that, "it was the duty of the trustee to get as much
information on the subject as it could." Id. at 862. Retention of stock by a trustee has
been held to be proper where he acted with knowledge that the settlor of the trust, a
director of the corporation in question, retained the greater part of his personal holdings,
In re First Nat'l Bank, 25 N.Y.S.2d 221 (Sup. Ct. 1941), and also where a director and
the treasurer of a corporation had advised their friends to purchase their company's
stock, Bowker v. Pierce, 130 Mass. 262 (1881).
In general, the test by which a fiduciary was judged was whether or not he had
conscientiously taken advantage of all sources of information reasonably available to
him. Matter of McCafferty, 147 Misc. 179, 208 (Sur. Ct. 1933).
15 In re Clark's Will, 257 N.Y. 132, 177 N.E. 397 (1931).
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that the stock should not be sold. They consulted Henry
Clark, a brother of the testator, and first vice-president of
[one•of the sugar companies whose stock was held] and it
was his advice, given as late as 1928, not to sell. They con-
sulted Horace 0. Havemeyer and William 0. Havemeyer,
well-known figures in the sugar trade, and received the same
advice."
Thus trustees with access to pertinent information were consid-
ered to have a legal duty to gather and use it, and the more respon-
sible and aggressive ones did so until the concept of "insider liability"
began to complicate matters. Ironically, what is today designated as
"material inside information" 17 was the very type of information
which, if available, a prudent trustee was under a duty to consider in
making an informed judgment. Now, however, prudent trustees have
been confronted with the fact that such important and deeply rooted
forms of vigilance may entail their own kinds of liability under rule
101)-5 18
 and the body of law developing out of it.
B. Inside Information and Bank Liability
The series of "insider" liability cases beginning with Cady,
Roberts," and continuing to the recent Investors Management case,2°
has raised serious problems with respect to traditional relationships and
information flows within commercial banks. Bankers, by the nature of
their business as lenders, solicit and receive significant financial infor-
mation from the companies with which they do business. 2' Trading
10
 Id. at 138, 177 N.E. at 399.
17
 Material information is information which is essentially extraordinary in nature
and is reasonably certain to have a substantial effect on the market price of the security,
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir.) (citing 51 Va. L. Rev. 1271,
1289), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1968), which affects the probable future of the com-
pany, or which may affect the desire of investors to buy, hold or sell the company's
securities, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 849. In Investors Management
Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267 (July 29, 1971), reprinted in [1970-
1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 78,163, the SEC indicated that, in deter-
mining whether a particular piece of information met the broad test of materiality, a
number of factors were to be considered, including the degree of specificity of the in-
formation, the extent to which the information differs from existing public information,
and the reliability of the information in light of its nature and source and the circum-
stances under which it was received. Id. at 80,519.
18 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972).
19 Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
20 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267 (July 29, 1971), reprinted in
[1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. If 78,163.
21 This access to information may be an important consideration to prospective
trust customers in choosing a bank as trustee:
A bank officer making a loan is likely to learn as much about the internal affairs
of his borrower as the management. Trustors know this. That is just the reason
why many of them entrust their funds to bankers as fiduciaries.
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on "material inside information," however, is currently considered to
be contrary to public policy, as expressed in the Securities Exchange .
Act and enforced through rule 10b-5. That rule reflects the policy that
there is an inherent inequity involved where one investor takes advan-
tage of such inside information knowing that it is unavailable to the
general investing public. Transfers of information between the trust
and commercial departments are therefore unchallengeable only so
long as "material inside information" does not pass. 22 Thus, balanced
against its fiduciary duty to trust customers, the bank trustee now has
an implied obligation to the investing public.
It is in this context that commercial banks have attempted to
erect and have asserted the existence of a "wall"—a barrier to the flow
of any "material" or "privileged" information—between the trust de-
partment on one side and the bank's directors and commercial depart-
ment on the other. Conceptually, the existence of a wall implies that
the trust department acts autonomously on the basis of information
generated internally or received from independent external sources.
Thus, with a completely and demonstrably effective wall, the trust
department could not successfully be charged with trading on "material
inside information" simply because such information was available
to the commercial department.
A number of legal problems confront bank trustees seeking to
establish a wall as a means of resolving the potential conflicts and
reducing the potential legal liabilities arising from the imposition of
rule 10b-5 requirements on traditional information flows. While the
magnitude of these problems is somewhat dependent upon the char-
acter and solidity of a particular wall, the technical legal issues involved
are common to all wall-using banks. One problem that must be sur-
mounted in designing a wall is that distinctions must be drawn between
information that is definitely privileged and information that is either
not privileged or of uncertain status. The law surrounding rule 10b-5,
as it has developed thus far, implies that a trustee possessing material
inside information cannot use this infOrmation to benefit his fiduciary
accounts.23 Accordingly, were a beneficiary to institute a surcharge
action against a trustee for failure to use material inside information
Statement of John Lee, Executive Vice President of the New York Clearing House, in a
panel discussion, Banking Regulation—Too Much, Too Little—and the Prospects for
the Seventies, 26 Bus. Lawyer 139, 148 (1970).
22 Harfield, Texas Gulf Sulphur and Bank Internal Procedures Between the Trust
and Commercial Departments, 86 Banking L.J. 869, 873 (1969).
23 This conclusion may be distilled from the series of cases arising out of the
manner in which Merrill Lynch, as underwriting broker, handled the issuance of
Douglas Aircraft Co, securities. See Shulof v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 93,147 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
Smachlo v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed, Sec. L. Rep. 11 93,148 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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in investment decision-making, a court would probably dismiss the
suit on the grounds that the beneficiary had no right to expect an
illegal act by a trustee." Much of the information received by the vari-
ous departments of a walled bank, however, is not "material inside infor-
mation." The total walling-off of departments would therefore impede
the . flow of that relevant information which is not barred from use by
"insider" prohibitions. Although it is possible to hypothesize a wall
capable of selectively filtering out "material inside information" while
permitting the free flow of all other useful knowledge, in reality such
discriminating control presents formidable administrative difficulties.
As noted below, none of the walls revealed by the present study were
organized with sufficient care and administrative apparatus to suggest
the likelihood that such discrimination can be exercised.
A second difficulty arises from the fact that the concept of "mate-
rial inside information" is imprecise, and what appears to be privileged
information at the time it is first noted by the trustee bank may later
be found by a court to be non-privileged. Fear of such an occurrence
has been partially allayed by the recent Investors Management deci-
sion. In that case, the SEC asserted that:
[T]here is no basis for the stated concern that a fiduciary
who refrains from acting because he has received what he
believes to be restricted information would be held derelict
if it should later develop that the information could in fact
have been acted upon legally. If that belief is reasonable,
his non-action could not be held improper'
In spite of this holding, there are still a number of valid reasons for
fiduciary concern. First, this statement does not apply to a case where,
because a wall is unable to discriminate between different kinds of
information, the trust department fails to receive from the commercial
24 The language of Cady, Roberts seems to imply that the fiduciary's duty to obey
rule 10b-5 is paramount. The SEC held that the relationship of a broker to his dis-
cretionary accounts "could not justify any actions by him contrary to law. Even if we
assume the existence of conflicting fiduciary obligations, there can be no doubt which
is primary here. On these facts, clients may not expect of a broker the benefits of his
inside information at the expense of the public generally." 40 S.E.C. at 916. The duties
of a trustee to his beneficiary may well be greater than those which a broker owes to
his client. The SEC reaffirmed its position in Investors Management, holding that "[t]he
obligations of a fiduciary do not include performing an illegal Act." [1970-1971 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 80,522. Judge Friendly, speaking about the trustees'
conflicting duties in a similar situation, said that the plaintiff beneficiary "could hardly
be heard to claim compensation for the premium he might have extracted from some
innocent victim if he had known of the fraud and the buyer did not." Levine v. Seilon,
Inc., 439 F.2d 328, 333 (2d Cir. 1971).
26 Investors Management Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267 (July
29, 1971) reprinted in [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. Q 78,163, at
80,522.
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department information about which no confidentiality issue could have
been raised. Second, the Commission opinion still leaves open the
question of the "reasonableness" of a bank's belief that particular in-
formation must be regarded as privileged. Finally, the courts them-
selves have not yet spoken on this question. Thus, despite the language
of the opinion, it cannot be assumed that the failure of a trust depart-
ment to receive or to use certain information can be successfully
defended simply on the basis of the bank's paramount duty to obey
rule 10b-5.26
A third problem is one of credibility and ability to prove, in a
10b-5 action, effective separation. There is, after all, a legal unity
and a common interest among bank departments separated by a wall.
One set of officers and directors is charged with legal responsibility
for all parts of the bank. The passing of crucial information between
departments is obviously quite simple to accomplish. Thus where trust
department trading has occurred while the commercial department was
in possession of borderline or confidential information, the burden of
proving the existence of an effective wall could present real difficulties;
and even where the bank is able to demonstrate that a solid wall exists,
the question of jury acceptance of such proof remains. In the Investors
Management case, several of the defendants failed to convince the
SEC that they had traded on the basis of non-privileged information.
A footnote by the Commission contains the following language:
We consider it appropriate to observe that in future cases we
would view as suspect and subject to close scrutiny a defense
that there was no internal communication of material non-
public information and its source by a member of a broker-
dealer firm or other investment organization who received it,
where a transaction of the kind indicated by it was effected
by his organization immediately or closely thereafter. A
showing of such receipt and transaction prior to the time the
information became public should in itself constitute strong
evidence of knowledge by the one who effected the transac-
tion and by the firm.27
26 The recent case of Black v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d 362, 72
Cal. Rptr. 157 (Ct. App. 1968), exemplifies the unsympathetic view which some courts
have taken toward a fiduciary who places himself in a conflict of interest situation. The
court said: "[W]e have been given no sufficient reason for permitting a person to
avoid one fiduciary obligation by accepting another which conflicts with it • . . The
officer-director's conflict in duties is the classic problem encountered by one who serves
two masters. It should not be resolved by weighing the conflicting duties; it should be
avoided in advance . . . or terminated when it appears." Id. at 368, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
For a discussion of this case, see Leiman, Conflict of Interest and Related Problems of
Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisors, First Annual PLI Institute on Securities Regu-
lation 335-38 (Mundheim, Fleischer, and Glazer eds. 1970).
27 [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep, at 80,522 n.28.
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In borderline cases, therefore, the bank trustee may be proceeding
at some risk. If the bank acts in a manner consistent with the posses-
sion of inside information, prior to the public disclosure of such in-
formation, it may be held to be a "tippee" 28—the "tip" having been
passed to the trust department by the commercial department or by a
bank director with relevant outside affiliations. To prove the existence
of an effective wall in such a case would pose practical and evidentiary
difficulties. On the other hand, should an effective wall be established,
preventing any information from being transmitted to or used by the
trust department, the bank may open itself up to suit by trust benefi-
ciaries alleging that the bank's failure to utilize non-privileged in-
formation to protect the trust or to advance its investment objectives
was a breach of duty." The fact that the information was withheld
from the trust department in the interest of avoiding transmission
of material inside information would not excuse the failure," since
the bank trustee should not have put itself in a position where its
interest in the maintenance of normal commercial relationships and
the avoidance of 10b-5 suits might conflict with its duty to act in the
best interests of the trust 31
28
 The term "tippee" refers to one who, although unrelated to a corporation, re-
ceives inside information concerning it from another who does stand in a fiduciary rela-
tionship with the corporation. See Bromberg, Tippee Risks and Liabilities, 3 Rev. Sec.
Reg. 875 (1970).
29 As indicated above, see text at notes 4-5 supra, banks traditionally held out their
commercial departments to be a special source of information. Today, trust department
advertising continues to call attention to an institution's information gathering skills in
the investment area. A recent advertisement for the First National City Bank (New
York) uses the following language: "Our research department knows how to harvest the
most significant investment information. They keep on top of what's happening in the
city. All around the country. In all fields of investment." Institutional Investor 25
(August 1971). Courts may hold an institutional trustee to its representations of su-
perior investment skill. See, e.g., Liberty Title and Trust Co. v. Flews, 142 N.J.Eq. 493,
60 A.2d 630 (Ct. Ch. 1948). Where a wall obstructs the flow of relevant investment in-
formation and the trust beneficiaries have not been notified of this constraint, a court
may find that the trustee has not made adequate full disclosure.
80 A bank's directors are specifically responsible for the trust department, including
the investment and disposition of property. Comptroller of the Currency of the United
States, Comptroller's Manual for Representatives in Trust, § 9.7.
81 There is a line of cases holding that a corporate trustee may not put itself in
a position where its interest is or might be in conflict with its duty. See, e.g., Albright v.
Jefferson County Nat'l Bank, 292 N.Y. 31, 53 N.E.2d 753 (1944) ; In re Ryan's Will,
291 N.Y. 376, 52 N.E.2d 909 (1943). An exception to this rule may be made where the
creator of the trust has placed the trustee in an obvious conflict of interest situation which
was .recognized and accepted at the time the trust was drawn. In re Kellog's Trust, 35
Misc. 2d 541, 230 N.Y.S.2d 836 (Sup. Ct. 1962). See also Black v. Shearson, Hammill
& Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d 362, 72 Cal. Rptr. 157 (Ct. App. 1968), discussed in note 26
supra.
The rule suggested by these cases is obviously not predominant, else the potential
conflicts of corporate trustees could not have become as extensive as they are in fact,
but it hovers in the background as a consideration that may be brought to bear in cases
where beneficiaries are dissatisfied with the trustee's conduct. Although the rule would
30
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IL THE WALL AS A BUSINESS REALITY
The wall is not a physical barrier between departments, although
it may provide for their physical separation; it is essentially a body
of rules and procedures designed to control the interdepartmental flow
of information. Most walls are not intended to prevent the passage of
all information or to terminate all forms of contact between depart-
ments. The typical wall is much more limited in scope—a result, in
large part, of major structural and legal impediments to complete
separation.
A. Business Impediments to a Solid Wall
1. Reciprocal Service and New Business Effort
Implicit in the preceding discussion of the new legal environment
facing trust banks is the fact that the efforts of the past decade to
establish a wall between trust and commercial departments of banks
have not arisen from the business needs of the separate departments
or of the bank as a whole. On the contrary, the business advantages of
associated operations were the key elements underlying the long
process of integration of trust and commercial operations." The ad-
vantages of knowledge-sharing and the usefulness of information flows
have already been mentioned." In addition, an affiliated trust depart-
ment—in its role as a so-called "feeder"—has long been recognized as
a factor facilitating the expansion of the commercial department, and
aiding in the retention of existing bank customers, by permitting the
bank to offer a full line of banking services. Indeed, the services offered
by the trust department may be the marginal element that wins or
holds a customer," and it may be necessary to offer such services in a
comprehensive package if rivals are doing so. Customers initially
brought into the bank by the trust department may be induced to
purchase other bank services." Trust departments control the disposi-
probably not be applied where trust beneficiaries could have profited by the use of
confidential information that was held in the commercial department but not trans-
mitted to or used by the trust department, it could well be considered pertinent where
confidential information fails to pass through a wall constructed to circumvent potential
conflicts of interest, or where corporate relationships influence the acquisition, sale, or
non-sale of trust securities.
82
 See J. C. Smith, The Development of Trust Companies in the United States 356,
364, 409 (1927); Searle, Trust New Business Program, 106 Trusts and Estates 1133
(1967); Kanaly, The Bank Trust Department: Its Purposes and Their Achievement, 108
Trusts and Estates 883 (1969).
88 See text at notes 12-14 supra.
84 Treman, Need of Close Working Relationship Between Commercial and Trust
Departments, 100 Trusts and Estates 1169, 1170 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Treman],
states that "when a bank offers well rounded and competent trust service, it can often
hold important banking business that would otherwise be lost to competing institutions."
85 "It should be part of every trust officer's duty, and so pointed out to him, that
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tion of trust deposit accounts, which traditionally have been held
almost exclusively in the associated bank. 3° Finally, these associational
benefits accrue in addition to whatever profits are generated internally
by the trust department itself.
Other parts of the bank, especially the commercial department,
have provided important reciprocal sources of business for the trust
department:
As the trust business became more and more an affiliated
service of commercial banks over the past 125 years, it was
increasingly natural that commercial customers of banks
constituted the best sources for trust business. For this reason
the degree of cooperation between commercial banking offi-
cers, directors and the trust department has always been im-
portant in the development of trust business."
Invitations to the bank to serve as corporate trustee, registrar, trans-
fer agent, or custodian of employee benefit plans, are more readily
obtained from the bank's commercial customers than from strangers,
and new business activities in the trust department focus heavily on
soliciting corporate business from the bank's commercial customers."
he must lose no opportunity to create new business for or serve other interests of the
bank. It is only by assisting the other fellow to build up his department that we can
rightfully expect or actually get him to assist us in building up ours." Roseberry, Coordi-
nation of Trust and Banking Department Activities, Proceedings of the Twelfth Mid-
Winter Trust Conference 56 (1931). "It is almost inevitable that if your competitor
serves your trust customer, the customer becomes his customer. On the other hand, the
trust department may be used as a tool to reach your competitor's customer. If he be-
comes a trust customer, he is likely to become a banking customer." Ferguson, Trust
Department Profits—At What Expense?, 102 Trusts & Estates 1173 (1963).
88
 In many banks the trust department is the largest single bank depositor. "Com-
mercial banks compete intensely for deposits; and a trust department is one of the
banking department's best and most reliable customers . . . . As a banking department
customer, the trust department is unique; its substantial balances exist without expense
to the banking department for solicitation or supervision." Treman, supra note 34, at
1169-70.
87
 Hunt, The Bank Loan Officer as a Source of New Business 5 (1961) (unpublished
thesis on file at the Pacific Coast Banking School, Seattle, Washington).
88
 According to studies cited in Hunt, supra note 37, at 2-3, 19-20, the volume of
trust business originating from commercial customers was estimated to be on the order
of 50% in 1945 and 1950 and about 25% in 1960. The expanding importance of employee
benefit plans has probably increased this percentage over the last decade. In the present
study, estimates provided by nine respondents of the amount of trust business attributable
to commercial customers ranged from 30% to 80%, the median being approximately
50%.
A recent SEC study has found a significant positive correlation between bank-
customer relationships via the trust department and commercial department customers:
"Loan and demand deposits also are associated positively with the existence of a
managerial relationship [e.g., management of employee benefit plan funds] between a
bank and a company . . . . Among other institutional types, the only positive, sys-
tematic correlation is between plan management and institutional size, indicating that
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Moreover, a significant amount of solicitation effort in the personal
trust and agency area is devoted to attracting the individual business
of officials of commercial customers. 39
Such cooperative efforts to generate new business involve informa-
tion exchanges and some degree of coordinated activity between trust
and commercial departments. They commonly go beyond mere ad hoc
referrals regarding specific prospects, and often include: (1) systematic
transmission of credit information as a basis for contacts;" (2) pro-
grams teaming new business officers in the trust department with
certain commercial officers; (3) quota and reward systems for referrals;
(4) joint presentations to prospective customers; and (5) formal
educational sessions." A discussion among trust officers of the methods
of utilizing to maximum advantage the trust department/commercial
department relationship has been summarized as follows:
[Officer #11 said her trust department arranges annually a
special program for commercial officers, partly educational
and partly social. Usually three trust officers cover three
aspects of trust department activity, and over a ten year
period this gives a lot of officer education. [Officer #21 said
that in his bank all credit files that meet certain criteria are
reviewed by the trust department as well as the loan officers.
these services are ordinarily provided by larger institutions." Institutional Investor Study
Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission, H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 2729 (1971).
89 See, e.g., United States Trust Company of New York, 1969 Annual Report 5:
In October we instituted a new service known as Plan FOUR, which consists
of an overall review and continuing surveillance of the personal financial affairs
of groups of top executives of major corporations. Our compensation will be
provided by the corporations themselves, which will offer our package of services
as a valuable and, we believe, sought-after fringe benefit. We have all of the
capabilities for this type of individual counseling within our organization today,
and the value to us of the establishment of such working relationships with
many of the leaders of American industry cannot be aver-estimated,
90 See, e.g., Wilkinson, Don't Isolate Your Trust Department, 99 Trusts and Estates
576, 577 (1960), in which one bank's program was described as follows: "[A] copy of
every credit memorandum comes to our trust department, so that we are able to pick
up the names of those good commercial customers who may otherwise have been over-
looked by our lending officers." Officers of seven banks interviewed in the present study
reported that credit information and reports of commercial officers are continually trans-
ferred to new business trust officers to facilitate contacts with potential clients.
41 A fairly typical operation in one moderate-sized bank was summarized by a new
business officer in a personal interview with the authors as follows: Each new business
officer is assigned to a number of group heads on the commercial side. He is to work
with those heads to get them to stimulate the employees under them to get new business,
There is a printed schedule of rewards for referrals that is applicable to either commercial
officers or estate planning officers. The estate planning officers focus their efforts on
establishing rapport with the group heads. There are also monthly sales meetings that
bring together both commercial and trust department personnel, at which the estate,
planning people get fifteen minutes in which they can report progress, prod,•and instruct
on the new business effort.
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[Officer #3] said his department has direct talks with loan
officers and is now preparing a sales-oriented manual. [Officer
#4] stated that some banks have an educational trust training
program for bank officers . . . ."
In spite of the new business obtained through such methods, trust
departments frequently operate at a loss on the basis of standard bank
accounting principles." Indeed, such losses have been a long-standing
problem in the trust field." Even many of the larger trust departments
appear to be unprofitable if bank earnings from trust deposits are not
credited to their profit and loss account." The widespread phenomenon
of trust department losses, coupled with the continued operation and
spread of these departments, suggests that their raison d'être must
often come from their special importance to the larger entity—that is,
from benefits to the bank that are external to the trust department.
Such justifiable functional integration is not easily reconciled with the
structural separation of a solid wall.
2. Structural Obstacles to a Wall
The solidity of a wall between the commercial and trust depart-
ments is affected by certain characteristics of banks and bank trust
departments inherent in the institutional structure. The board of direc-
tors of the bank is legally responsible for bank profits and for the
proper performance of fiduciary obligations in all cases where the bank
is a trustee." It is the stockholders' capital fund that protects the
42 106 Trusts and Estates 1115, 1121 (1967).
48 Searle, Trust New Business Program, 106 Trusts and Estates 1133, 1136 (1967),
estimates that "at least three quarters of the trust departments of the nation are un-
profitable, even after allowing them credit for monies on deposit with the banking
department, as well as credit for services performed for the banking department."
44 Smith, supra note 32, at 364.
45 The 1969 annual survey of trust department income and expenses in New York,
New Jersey and Fairfield County, Connecticut, carried out by the New York Federal
Reserve Hank indicated that 69 of the 126 trust departments surveyed, or over 50%,
showed net losses before taking into account bank earnings from trust customers' com-
mercial deposits. After deposit credits only 29 showed net losses. Trust Department Income
and Expenses, 109 Trusts and Estates 960 (1970).
The advantage of trust deposits to many trustee banks, though still invaluable, may
be diminishing somewhat. There has been increased pressure in the last decade to
minimize trust department cash and to allocate these values to the fiduciary accounts
themselves. It is not inconceivable that bank handling of trust deposits may be under
legal attack in the not too distant future in the same manner as is the traditional
appropriation by the bank of a large fraction of the value of brokerage commissions
via the purchase of deposits. For a discussion of the class actions filed against the
Chemical Bank New York Trust Co. and the Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. for alleged
misuse of brokerage commissions, see 81 BNA Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. at A-1 (December 16,
1970).
46 "All matters pertinent [to the operation and performance of the trust depart-
ment], including determination of policies, the investment and disposition of property
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trust beneficiaries, and any surcharge for a failure of responsibility
by the directors will be levied upon that fund. 4' Thus the board and
the chief executive officers of the bank have a responsibility to both
the commercial and trust departments, and the creation of an effective
wall could require of them a dichotomy of mind that may be difficult
or impossible to attain."
The same structural problem is evident where the bank's invest-
ment policies are said to depend in large measure on its knowing and
evaluating corporate management. An officer of the United States
Trust Company of New York, for example, has said that his company
makes about eighty percent of its investment judgment on the basis of
management." Another officer of the same company stated that " [a] t
U.S. Trust we very seldom invest a substantial amount in a company
whose management we've never met." He indicated that management
can best be appraised when the corporation is a customer of the bank's
commercial operation.° Once these officers have made an appraisal
of management from the standpoint of the bank as a lender, they will
find it difficult to change that appraisal on the ground of new informa-
tion flowing into the commercial department without simultaneously
altering their judgment of that management from the standpoint of
their responsibilities to trust accounts.
The board and chief executive officers, in attempting to establish
an effective wall, may delegate responsibility to lower echelon person-
nel and create separate units between which few if any interchanges of
information occur. Ultimate responsibility nonetheless remains with
those charged with legal obligations to the bank's shareholders. Thus,
even where divisional separation and delegation of authority are
relatively great, in strategic cases or crisis situations the matter will
be brought before the board or principal executives for action, and the
wall may suddenly disintegrate as information from all departments
is pooled in the interest of the larger entity. Typical of the examples
held in a fiduciary capacity, and the direction and review of the actions of all officers,
employees and committees utilized by the bank in the exercise of its fiduciary powers,
are the responsibility of the Board." Comptroller of the Currency of the United States,
Comptroller's Manual for Representatives in Trust § 9.7.
47 See, e.g., N.Y. Bank. Law § 100-b (McKinney 1971).
48
 Speaking at a panel discussion dealing with bank related insider problems, Mr.
Phillip Loomis, General Counsel of the SEC, stated:
I was talking about this point to a banker—and it wasn't too small a bank. He
said that he was often consulted by both the trust department and the com-
mercial department, and that what he learned in one capacity he had to
"forget" in the other, which struck me as something of a mental feat I
The Loan Officer and Conflicts of Interest, 51 J. Comm'l Bank Lending 3, 10 (1969).
49 Statement of T. Richard Spoor, Vice President, United States Trust Co., quoted
in Report on New Jersey Trust Conference, 108 Trusts and Estates 54, 56 (1969).
50 Statement of Charles Buek, How the SEC Study Views Bank Trusts—and Vice
Versa, 89 Finance 34, 40 (1971).
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which illustrate this point is a case in which a good corporate customer
of a large bank with a relatively solid wall refused to pay the higher
charges levied by the trust department on custodial accounts, on the
ground that the company's bank deposit was sufficiently large to
exempt it from such an increase. The matter was taken to the chief
executive officer of the bank for a decision. He decided to accommodate
the customer, who was permitted to escape the higher rates. Interest-
ingly, no credit was given to the trust department for the deposit which
justified this discriminatorily low rate, although the department was
permitted to note this arrangement and concession in their internal
reports to top management!".
Another important form of wall breakdown, illustrative of the
limited delegation of authority to a walled division, may occur when
the trust department wishes to sell a large block of stock in a corpora-
tion which is a valued commercial customer. In one such case, where
the customer had earlier evidenced a sensitivity to such "disloyal"
behavior on the part of one of its major banks, the matter was placed
in the hands of the chief executive officer of the bank. It was this top
officer rather than the ranking trust department executive who gave
clearance for the sale. A third type of case, in which a crisis situation
generates a sudden flow of information outside of the trust department,
may be illustrated by the events surrounding the threatened tender
offer made in 1969 by Leasco Data Processing Corporation for Chemi-
cal Bank of New York. In the process of responding to this threat, the
top management of Chemical Bank, which had established an official
"wall" between the commercial and trust departments through which
no privileged information could flow, very quickly put itself in posses-
sion of a detailed breakdown of the amount of Leasco stock held in
the various trust accounts of the Chemical Bank trust department. 52
Within the formal organization of most banks there is generally a
directors' committee concerned with trust affairs. This committee is
sometimes comprised solely of outside directors, but more commonly
includes both outside and inside directors, having at least one executive
officer of the bank among them. In some cases, this board trust com-
mittee is essentially inactive, functioning only as a formal body to
fulfill a legal requirement—a "rubber stamp"; or it may be designed
mainly to evaluate the trust personnel, who are given the authority
to make all fundamental decisions. In other cases, however, the board
trust committee is active in setting trust department policy, planning
51 This case was related in a confidential interview between the author and an officer
of the trust department in question.
52 Hearings on Leasco Data Processing Corp. Before the Antitrust Subcomm. of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 148, 532 (1969).
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investment strategies or evaluating trust department security hold-
ings.°
Officer-director participation in trust department decision-making
varies in degree from bank to bank and is hard to measure very pre-
cisely. In reviewing the collected interview data and documents
examined in the present study, it was found that in about twenty banks,
or approximately one-third of those examined, commercial officers were
currently serving or had recently served on active decision-making
committees within the trust department. An intensive review of more
detailed data available for twelve large and medium-sized trust depart-
ments revealed that in five cases the board trust committee, or individual
high level commercial officers serving on trust committees, played an
"active" role in trust department decision-making. In three cases the
board was clearly inactive. In the four remaining banks, the evidence
was conflicting and unclear, partly because of recent changes in struc-
ture and policy. In the five instances where there were either active
boards, effective officers, or both, the duality of function of these
officials extended into the committee and decision-making structure
itself. Thus, the involvement of bank directors at decision-making
levels of bank administration is a further structural obstacle to an
effective wall.
3. Obstacles Arising from Association and Proximity
Another set of obstacles to an effective wall may be described as
associational factors. The smaller the bank and trust department, the
more likely that trust and commercial people will be in close physical
proximity. In some cases they may even be identical persons. Even in
large institutions, dining facilities, for example, are usually shared in
common by all bank departments. There is also a fair amount of
personnel movement between trust and commercial departments in
some banks, which makes close personal relationships likely.
Under these circumstances, information available to the commercial
department and relevant to the trust department may well be in the
mind of the trust officer by virtue of his simultaneous occupancy of a
commercial banking position; otherwise it is probably nearby, in the
possession of the people—often personal friends or acquaintances—
who work under the same roof, for the same management and corporate
ends. In short, the forces of common interest, close physical proximity
and ties of personal loyalty could be overcome only by an extremely
strong wall.
68 These and succeeding statements are based primarily on interviews conducted by
the authors and staff with past and present employees of over 60 trust banks.
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4.- Efficiency Considerations
A major obstacle to the creation of a fully effective wall between
the commercial and trust departments is the fact that such a wall would
be detrimental to bank efficiency in a number of ways. A wall would
make the gathering of information and the marketing of bank services
more costly and less effective." A wall would also reduce the possibility
of utilizing available manpower in special projects. In many banks,
trust department personnel have been used to work on merger plans,
or on company analyses for domestic or foreign correspondents, which
require access to privileged commercial information. Strict adherence
to the wall concept would interrupt this interdepartmental flow of
personnel and reduce the ability of the bank to utilize its skilled
manpower with maximum efficiency."
B. The Current State of Bank Walls"
In a majority of walled banks the essential component of the wall
is an official policy statement or rule prohibiting the transfer of con-
fidential information between departments, or limiting other depart-
ments' access to commercial department credit files. The demand for
a wall is likely to be directly related to bank size. Thus in many trust
banks, particularly smaller institutions whose trust and commercial
personnel overlap, no walls have yet been established. Moreover, small
institutions generally have relatively few commercial customers whose
securities are likely to be of interest to the trust department. Even
among the larger banks, however, rules have not been promulgated in
all cases; in the sample studied, several banks with trust assets in
excess of $1 billion had still not established an official rule on transfers
of information between departments.
Of the thirty banks examined in this study for which information
was available regarding the accessibility of credit files to the trust
department, eleven banks reported that the files were available
currently, either directly (six banks) or by roundabout procedures
(five banks); ten banks reported that credit files were accessible in the
recent past (1966-1970); and nine banks reported that credit files were
entirely closed off. These results should be accepted with some qualifi-
cation, however. This is an area of constant change, so that the ten
banks that indicated continued accessibility may have since changed
64 Roseberry, supra note 35, at 54-55.
55 Treman, supra note 34, at 1169. The legal pressures for a wall recently caused
one large trust department, which had used its research personnel with considerable
flexibility in a single department servicing the needs of both the commercial and the
trust investing sector, to separate the two completely.
56 This section describes the scope and character of bank walls in the period 1967-
1971 based upon interviews with current and former trust bank personnel.
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their policies. Moreover, in seven of the nine banks where credit files
were reportedly inaccessible to the trust department, the information
on inaccessibility was derived solely from "official" policies or rules as
reported by high officers of the bank; no data was gathered from lower
echelon personnel or outsiders either confirming or denying the effective
implementation of these policies.
Of the banks that have closed off or sharply restricted trust depart-
ment access to commercial credit files, few, if any, have terminated
all communication between analysts, portfolio managers and loan
officers in the various departments. In most cases the official walls are
applicable only to confidential information. For example, at Chase
Manhattan Bank, one of the first banks to concern itself with this
problem, the official policy guide not only confines its wall prohibitions
to "inside information" but states explicitly that " [t]hese instructions
. . . in no way alter the duty of those charged with trust investment
decisions to obtain all relevant information which they can properly
receive and use. The proscription relates solely to 'inside information'
which is 'material.' "57
Certain forms of two-way verbal communication between depart-
ments are still acknowledged by personnel in most large banks with
official walls," and access of commercial personnel to trust department
files and analysts is often unrestricted even where the flow in the
opposite direction is limited." A trust department officer in a walled
bank is generally still permitted to contact a loan officer for non-
privileged information, such as a generalized judgment on the quality
of the management of a corporate customer; and a loan officer will
sometimes consult with a knowledgeable trust department analyst on
such matters as the analyst's interpretation of some complex facts con-
tained in the prospectus for a security offering.
The available data indicate that both decisions as to what con-
stitutes "privileged" information and enforcement of wall rules are
generally left to the individuals subject to the rules. The Chase
memorandum cited above, one of the few that attempts to define the
difficult terms involved, states that "No be 'material,' the information
BT Chase Manhattan Bank, Policy Guide, quoted in Staff of Antitrust Subcomm.
of the House Judiciary Comm., 92d Cong., 1st Sess., Investigation of Conglomerate
Corporations 198-99 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Investigation of Conglomerate Corpora-
tions]. The policy guide of Nov. 4, 1968, was still in effect and applicable in late 1971.
58 Of 31 banks responding the questions concerning verbal communication between
personnel in the commercial and trust departments, only 4 reported that commercial
officers are not permitted to talk to trust department people at ail. In the remaining
27 banks, although willingness to discuss investment matters varied, 17 reported that
commercial officers readily communicate with trust department personnel.
Be The problem of confidentiality rarely arises in connection with information
originating with the trust department, so that the flow from that department to the
commercial department does not raise serious insider problems.
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.must be such that, if generally known, it would be likely to affect invest-
ment decisions or the market value of the security involved. To be
`inside,' the information must not have been publicly disclosed."" Even
these definitions clearly leave a great deal to be resolved by the
enforcing individual or group. The frequent absence of any official
definition of inside information, and the even more general failure to
produce operational rules for identifying different classes of informa-
tion, suggest that some walls may be only "for the record," and that
others may be extremely crude in application. Unless the cutoff of
information flows is comprehensive—and the data reveal that it
generally is not—a serious effort at sorting out privileged and non-
privileged information, involving considerable thought, operational
definitions and enforcement machinery, is required if the wall involved
is to accomplish its objectives.
In some banks, individuals are advised to consult their department
head or the bank's legal counsel in cases where there is doubt as to the
confidentiality of information and the appropriateness of interdepart-
mental communications. In other banks, communication between trust
department and commercial department personnel can be carried out
only with the approval of the head of the department." Apart from this
procedural arrangement, the present study revealed no instance where
special enforcement machinery has been established to supervise inter-
departmental information flows on a continuing basis. Thus it may be
concluded that even today, with a few possible and partial exceptions,
the wall can be and is breached even where official wall rules have been
announced."'
The coordination of trust department and commercial personnel
in undertaking new business solicitation efforts on a joint basis has
60 Investigation of Conglomerate Corporations, supra note 57, at 198-99.
61 In a recent panel discussion before an audience of bankers, one banker-participant
made the following statement:
In our shop the trust department officer can get the credit file only if he gets
approval from the manager of the credit department. Just as a matter of
interest, with a show of hands, how many people here work in banks where
only the commercial banking officers can get to the credit files? In other words,
where the trust department officers cannot get those files under any circum-
stances. (The show of hands was a little less than a majority of the audience.]
Statement of Mr. Duffy, quoted In The Loan Officer and Conflicts of Interest, 51 J.
Comm'l Bank Lending 3, 10 (1969).
62 According to Mr. David Rockefeller, Chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank: "To
assure the proper use and control of information received by the bank in its several
capacities, there is no flow, or incidental communication of inside information, from the
commercial departments or divisions of the bank to the fiduciary investment department
." Hearing on. H.R. 5700, H.R. 3287 & H.R. 7440 Before the House Comm. on Bank-
ing and Currency, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 751 (1971) (testimony of Mr. Rocke-
feller). In light of the textual conclusions above, it is submitted that it is unlikely this
assertion is accurate and that indeed the accuracy of such a statement is beyond Mr.
Rockefeller's or any similarly situated bank officer's capacity to know.
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already been noted."' Little or no attempt has been made to erect a wall
in this sphere, which involves referrals, introductions, and often joint
briefings and educational efforts. When customers call at the bank, for
social or other reasons, it is not uncommon for both trust department
and commercial personnel to be invited to the technical presentations
or social gatherings, each of which may have a business value for the
respective department. When the securities of a commercial customer
are to be sold by the trust department, the commercial officer in charge
of the account is frequently notified in advance.
There is also a continuing tendency on the part of bank officers
to look upon the bank as a single entity whose various parts can be
mobilized in the interest of individual departments, thus benefiting the
profit-making organization as a whole. Several examples have been
cited above." A further illustration is provided in the recent Investiga-
tion of Conglomerate Corporations," where an executive of a customer
of the walled Chase Manhattan Bank (who had himself previously
been an officer of Chase), expressed a desire to pay for a trust depart-
ment service with an additional commercial balance rather than a
larger fee. An internal office memorandum of Chase, dated October 3,
1967, states:
During a discussion with [the customer officer] yesterday,
[he] asked me whether or not the transfer agency relation-
ships we have from Gulf & Western are profitable to us. [He]
felt that because of the high volume, these may not be showing
the profit that we would like. If this is the case, he would
prefer that we make our adjustment in balances rather than
by increasing fees."
It is interesting to note that compensation to the trust department in
the form of payment to the commercial arm of the bank was not
automatically ruled out as impermissible, and was, in fact, suggested
by a former Chase officer. Compensation to the "other side" of the wall,
then, is a convenience that some commercial customers desire, and
even a walled bank finds it difficult to avoid making this kind of
accommodation for good customers. It is clear, then, that some form of
communication and mechanical adjustment will have to move across
the wall in order to implement an intrabank compensation arrangement
satisfactory to all departments.
63 See text at notes 37-45 supra.
64 See text following note 33 supra.
65
 Investigation of Conglomerate Corporations, supra note 57.
56 Id. at 182-83.
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CONCLUSION
The traditional role played by most bank trust departments as
service adjuncts of the commercial bank, and the role of the commercial
arm in facilitating the growth of trust business, have involved close
communication and reciprocal accomodation between the two depart-
ments. The relationships arising out of these integrated operations
facilitated the bank's performance of its fiduciary duties as trustee,
and originally constituted a major reason for the affiliation of trust and
commercial operations within one banking institution." However, these
same interdepartmental relationships seriously hamper the bank in its
attempt to comply with the legal duties imposed upon it by rule 10b-5
as it is currently interpreted by the courts. The deep mark left by the
historic association of trust and commercial departments, together with
a wide array of business objectives, structural, associational and effi-
ciency considerations, makes a truly effective wall between these depart-
ments costly to the banks and inherently difficult to construct or main-
tain. The challenge to the law in attempting to resolve these problems is
formidable. Changing business practices give rise to a proliferation of
unanticipated legal issues, and temporary solutions rapidly became
institutionalized, creating vested interests that courts may be reluctant
to challenge on the basis of abstract principles. 08 The result is chronic
uncertainty as to the state of the law at the frontier of "advanced"
business practice, with the facts of individual cases frequently giving
little indication as to what decisions might result with a somewhat
altered factual context.
To a considerable extent the wall that banks have built over the
past ten years is an artificial product of the legal necessities and pres-
sures discussed above. In the larger banks, increased size and bureau-
cratization have facilitated the necessary separation. A large trust
67
 For a further discussion of this point, see Herman, Conflicts of Interest in the
Savings and Loan Industry, Wharton School Study of the Savings and Loan Industry
for the Home Loan Bank Board 773-81 (1969).
68
 The Kentucky Court of Appeals, confronted with a trust law prohibition poten-
tially applicable to a current business practice, reasoned as follows:
It seems to us that the rigorous rule of absolute prohibition of trust-to-trust
transactions, irrespective of the particular circumstances, as laid down by the
Ohio Supreme Court . . . and perhaps by other courts less explicitly or directly,
is not required in the application of the principle of loyalty. Some of the largest
and strongest financial institutions of the country have become such because
of their satisfactory trusteeship of many estates. It appears to be a common
practice and one generally recognized among the most honorable of financiers
as proper and legitimate. So far as it is reflected in the opinions of the courts
of the country the practice seldom resulted in harm.
Bryan v. Security Trust Co., 296 Ky. 95, 102, 176 S.W.2d 104, 109 (1943). See also
In re Rees' Estate, 53 Ohio L. Abs. 385, 85 N.E.2d 563 (Ct. App. 1949), holding that
the duty of the court, in light of modern business transactions, is to determine whether
there is a substantial breach of legal requirements rather than mere technical breaches.
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department develops its own organizational interests, objectives and
autonomy. Physical separation and profit center status reinforce the
impetus toward autonomy. Increased legal pressures for the wall have
been partially met through greater bank formalization of trust depart-
ment autonomy.
In some banks, especially smaller institutions, the construction of
a wall has not even been attempted as yet; in others it has been built,
but in general it has been made with materials that have failed to
resolve the problems that flow from the impact of rule 10b-5 on the
historic role and continuing mode of integration of the trust department
into the commercial bank. A resolution of these difficulties will not be
easy. Total separation of trust and commercial activities into com-
pletely unaffiliated entities, if required by law, would settle the un-
certainty, but this solution involves two principal difficulties. First, a
large number of existing trust relationships are based upon the financial
power, responsibility and influence arising from the bank's commercial
activities, so that severing the relationship would present a formidable
array of legal problems. A second difficulty arises from the service
nature and relatively low profitability of bank-supplied trust services.
The advantages to banks derived from providing these services, and
certain efficiencies in marketing, have almost certainly kept the costs
of trust services to public buyers below those that would prevail in a
bank-free trust service market." It is difficult to recommend, and would
be difficult for legislatures to require, structural changes that are likely
to injure the consumer of the relevant services, unless the evil to be
eliminated can be shown to be of great significance. Proof of such
significance has not been forthcoming. It is submitted that the insider
evils that would be corrected by total separation of trust and commer-
cial functions are not of major social importance.
Spin-offs into holding companies would be a half-way solution
that would seem to get at few, if any, of the problems considered in
this article. The same may be said for the Hunt Commission recom-
mendations." Those that are relevant here propose that:
69 The existence of 49 non-deposit trust companies raises the possibility that split-
ting off a trust department from a commercial bank would leave the trust department
as a viable entity. An examination of the existing non-deposit trust companies, however,
reveals that few are primarily in the business of offering fiduciary services to the public.
Some of them are in, or have evolved out of, the business of managing the wealth of
one family or operating as custodian to a title insurer or mutual fund. Those independent
non-deposit trust companies that are conducting a public fiduciary business find them-
selves at a competitive disadvantage in such vital areas as generating new business leads
and meeting the rates charged by other fiduciaries for comparable services. Few of the
trust companies unaffiliated with a commercial bank are prospering.
70 The 1970 Economic Report of the President called for the appointment of a
special presidential commission charged with conducting a thorough analysis of the
structure and regulation of financial institutions in the United States and to submit
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[1] trust departments in banks with total trust assets greater
than $200 million deny trust department investment personnel
access to commercial banking department credit information.
[2} no director, officer or employee of a corporate fiduciary
recommends or initiates any purchase or sale of securities on
the basis of insider information. 71
Such proposals are naive. The problem is not primarily the termination
of a steady flow of inside information between departments; rather it
is one of preventing the relatively infrequent transmission of especially
critical and strategic pieces of information. The Hunt Commission's
proposals fail to get at the root of this problem, which relates to the
interest of the bank as a profit-making entity in using all available in-
formation, the proximity and reciprocity interrelationships between
bank departments, and the structural overlap of power and responsi-
bility among the top officers and the board of directors. It is doubtful
whether the costs of the real solution to the problem—total separa-
tion—would be justified by the resulting benefits, and existing wall
rules and reforms such as those suggested by the Hunt Commission
seem to be inherently flimsy, a whistling in the dark.
recommendations directed toward improving the nation's financial system. The commis-
sion was appointed on February 19, 1970 and Reed 0. Hunt was named as Chairman.
The Commission submitted its findings and recommendations in a report dated De-
ce ber, 1971. •
71 Report of the President's Commission on Financial Structure and Regulation
(Hunt Commission) 101 (1971).
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